Currently Empty: ₹0.00
(2001) 7 SCC 740 | AIR 2001 SC 3958 — Supreme Court of India (5-Judge Constitution Bench: Pattanaik, Rajendra Babu, Mohapatra, Doraiswamy Raju & Shivaraj V. Patil, JJ.)
“Can Parliament dilute a constitutional protection for destitute women in the name of religious autonomy — and still remain within the Constitution?”
01 | MEET THE PARTIES
| Danial Latifi & Anr. (Petitioners) Danial Latifi, Shah Bano’s counsel, challenging the 1986 Act’s constitutionality; joined by other petitioners in clubbed writ petitions. |
| Union of India (Respondent) Defending the constitutional validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. |
02 | WHAT HAPPENED? (FACTS)
- Following the political backlash to Shah Bano (1985), Parliament enacted the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.
- Section 3(1)(a) of the Act confined a divorced Muslim woman’s entitlement to “reasonable and fair provision and maintenance” to within the iddat period.
- Danial Latifi challenged the Act as violative of Articles 14, 15 and 21, arguing it discriminated against Muslim women compared to women of other faiths who retained access to Section 125 CrPC indefinitely.
03 | THE BIG LEGAL QUESTION
- Is the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 constitutionally valid?
- Does confining maintenance to the iddat period violate Articles 14, 15 and 21?
04 | WHAT DID THE COURT DECIDE?
A 5-Judge Constitution Bench upheld the Act’s validity, but read down Section 3(1)(a): the husband must make “reasonable and fair provision” within the iddat period that is adequate for the divorced wife’s foreseeable future — not merely for the three-month iddat period itself.
05 | WHY DID THE COURT THINK SO?
A statute must, where possible, be construed to avoid unconstitutionality. “Provision” is a wider concept than “maintenance”: Parliament intended the husband to make advance, sufficient arrangements — to be settled within iddat — for the wife’s entire foreseeable future, thereby avoiding the discrimination that a literal, time-bound reading would otherwise produce.
06 | THE GOLDEN RULE (RATIO DECIDENDI)
A Muslim husband’s liability under Section 3(1)(a) of the 1986 Act is not confined to the iddat period; he must make reasonable and fair provision covering the divorced wife’s future life, even though it is to be arranged during iddat.
07 | WHY THIS CASE MATTERS TODAY
Reconciled a religion-specific statute with constitutional equality through purposive interpretation rather than invalidation; forms the middle link between Shah Bano (1985) and Mohd. Abdul Samad (2024) in the trilogy on Muslim women’s maintenance rights.
08 | CASE TIMELINE
| 1985 | Shah Bano judgment |
| 1986 | Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act enacted |
| 1986–1999 | Writ petitions filed and clubbed |
| 28 Sept 2001 | Supreme Court Constitution Bench judgment |
09 | COMPARE IT WITH ANOTHER LANDMARK CASE
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (1985) 2 SCC 556 — direct application of the secular Section 125 CrPC, later specifically legislated around.
10 | RELEVANT PROVISIONS
Sections 3 & 4, Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986; Articles 14, 15 & 21, Constitution of India; Sections 125 & 127(3)(b), CrPC.
11 | KEY LEGAL TERMS
Reasonable and fair provision ● Iddat ● Harmonious construction ● Doctrine of reading down
12 | EXAM MEMORY HACK
“Provision ≠ Period” — the money must last a lifetime, even though it is arranged within iddat.
13 | POSSIBLE EXAM QUESTIONS
Short Answer: What is meant by “reasonable and fair provision” under the 1986 Act?
Long Answer: Critically examine how Danial Latifi reconciled the 1986 Act with Articles 14 and 21.
Problem-Based: A Muslim woman received a one-time payment during iddat which she claims is inadequate for her lifetime needs. Advise her.
14 | TARAJU TAKEAWAY
Danial Latifi shows the judiciary protecting vulnerable women through interpretation rather than invalidation — the statute survives, but its bite falls on the husband’s obligation, not the wife’s rights.
